In late 2003, Norway passed a law mandating 40 percent of each gender on the board of publicly limited liability companies. The primary objective of this reform was to increase representation of women in top positions in the corporate sector and decrease gender disparity in earning within that sector. We document that the newly (post-reform) appointed female board members were observably more qualified than their female predecessors, and that the gender gap in earnings within boards fell substantially. While the reform may have improved representation of female employees at the very top of the earnings distribution (top 5 highest earners)within firms that were mandated to increase female participation on their board, there is no evidence that these gains at the very top trickled-down. Moreover the reform had no obvious impact on highly qualified women whose qualifications mirror those of the board members but who were not appointed to boards. We observe no statistically significant change in the gender wage gaps or in the female representation in top positions, although standard errors are large enough that we cannot rule economically meaningful gains. Finally, there is little evidence that the reform affected the decisions of women more generally; it was not accompanied by any change in female enrollment in business education programs, or a convergence in earnings trajectories between recent male and female graduates of such programs. While young women preparing for a career in business report being aware of the reform and expect their earnings and promotion chances to benefit from it, the reform did not affect their fertility and marital plans. Overall, in the short run the reform had very little discernible impact on women in business beyond its direct effect on the newly appointed female board members.
We analyze how boards use monitoring mechanisms, in particular the compensation package, to regulate CEO narcissism and maintain it at an appropriate level which protects shareholder interests. We first develop a model which formalizes the desirable level of CEO narcissism from the shareholders’ point of view. We then use the model to interpret the relations that we find between the variation in CEO narcissism and the lagged level of compensation package components, controlling for governance mechanisms and firm characteristics. Our empirical evidence is based on a ten-year panel data set tracking S&P 500 CEO narcissism. Our results clearly support that the time-varying component of CEO narcissism is affected by the compensation package (specifically cash bonuses) and that shareholders are therefore in position to control (to some extent) the evolution of CEO narcissism.
- The views and opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Alpha Architect, its affiliates or its employees. Our full disclosures are available here. Definitions of common statistics used in our analysis are available here (towards the bottom).
- Join thousands of other readers and subscribe to our blog.
- This site provides NO information on our value ETFs or our momentum ETFs. Please refer to this site.